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1 Introduction
Cloud storage is a fast growing service, whereby an individual or a company
stores its data on a storage facility owned and managed by a third party (the
cloud provider). The actual storage facility may be positioned at a single loca-
tion or scattered around the globe, but the cloud user does not need to know.
Cloud users can eliminate their own storage infrastructure, relying on the
cloud only. The migration from an owned infrastructure to a leased one has the
immediate benefit of avoiding capital investments in favour of a more flexible
expense management based on operational expenses only [1]. The decision to
migrate has however to weigh the risk components associated to both solutions.
Capital investments are one-off in nature but they may lead to savings in the
long run [2]. In addition, switching to the cloud may expose the cloud user to
the lock-in phenomenon and price rises (though the decision to continue buying
disks is exposed to disk price rises as well) [3]. But a cloud user can also keep
its own infrastructure and use the cloud for backup purposes only.
In either case, the cloud storage market is forecast to expand, and the need to
evaluate the different offers grows as well. Though a service can be thoroughly
described just by the complete set of its features, the most relevant point of
differentiation seems to be the price. The risk of commoditization of cloud com-
puting (of which cloud storage may be an ancillary function) has been pointed
out by Durkee [4], as has been the case with the web hosting industry. In fact,
at present cloud providers are pushing price as the most attractive leverage to
get users choose their platform.
Though we realize that the complexity of a service proposition cannot be
captured by price only, in this paper we focus on price. A comparison of the
technical merits of commercial cloud platforms has been reported in [5], but
no economic analysis has been accomplished so far. However, a comparison of
pricing plans for cloud storage is needed to decide whether to migrate or not. In
every analysis conducted so far about the opportunity to migrate, one or more
pricing plans have been adopted to draw conclusions about that opportunity:
in [6] and [1], just Amazon’s prices have been employed, while in [7] those prices
has been used along with four other providers (Rackspace, GoGrid, Nirvanix,
and EMC Atmos). In addition, analysing the pricing plans proposed by cloud
providers helps understand the price structure of the industry and its economies
of scale.
In this paper, we conduct a survey of pricing plans proposed by major cloud
providers. All prices have been gathered on the web and are correct at the time
of writing, though they may vary in the future.
For each pricing plan, we compute the unit price to uncover the strength of
economies of scale. In addition, we fit the pricing data to a basic semi-variable
price model, which includes just two parameters: the fixed fee and the variable
price per unit. We perform a Pareto-dominance analysis and find that some
pricing plans are dominated by others and could be removed from the shortlist
of providers to consider.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide some indications
about the current market size and composition. For the major providers we
provide all the pricing data in Section 3. The pricing plans are then classified and
compared in Section 4. We finally introduce the two-part tariff approximation
and use it to perform a Pareto-dominance analysis in Section 5.
2
2 The market of cloud storage
The cloud storage market is rapidly increasing. A number of providers offer
solutions both for consumers and companies, with the list increasing each day
(Google is the latest addition with its Google Drive service). In this section, we
provide some figures for the market size and list the major cloud providers we
are going to examine in this paper.
Official figures for the present size of the cloud storage market are not avail-
able. Some estimates have been distributed, typically by consultant firms. IDC
estimates that the total spending on storage systems, software, and professional
services by public cloud service providers will increase to $10.9 billion in 2015
[8]. An alternative estimate by the Taneja Group gives a figure of $4B for the
market today, with a growth to almost $10B by 2014 [9], giving a compound
annual growth rate of over 35%. According to a recent study released by Gart-
ner, the percentage of consumer content stored in the cloud will grow from a
slight 7% in 2011 to 36% in 2016 [10].
We have collected data from the major cloud providers. We base our analysis
on publicly advertised prices and don’t consider those companies that, though
offering cloud storage services, do not provide a public price list or provide
storage just as a part of an inclusive service. In the following sections, we
report the results for the following providers:
• Dropbox;
• Crashplan;
• SugarSync;
• IDrive;
• Google Drive;
• Box;
• Mozy;
• Carbonite;
• Symform;
• Amazon.
3 Survey of advertised prices
For our survey we have considered a wide range of cloud providers, as detailed in
Section 2. We have collected pricing information on their websites and obtained
the unit prices. In this section, we provide the details of the price survey for each
provider. All prices are correct at the time of writing, though they may vary in
the future. Though prices may be originally given in $, we have converted all
the money amounts in euros through a fixed conversion rate (1 ¤= 1.3 $). In
order to get a level comparison, all prices are referred to a month of usage.
Many providers address separately the consumer and the business markets,
by providing specific pricing plans. Different prices for the two categories come
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along with differentiated service features, among which the most relevant seems
to be the number of computers that can be backed up on the cloud platform.
Typically, consumer pricing plans allow for just one computer, while business
pricing plans all cater for more users. We stick to the consumer vs business
classification.
Whenever a provider offers several pricing packages which address the same
category, in the following we consider the cheapest one for the amount of memory
required.
3.1 Dropbox
Dropbox (www.dropbox.com) offers a very popular storage service, which fea-
tures both a consumer and a business category. A free basic service is available
for consumers, with a storage capacity up to 2 GB, though the maximum capac-
ity may be increased up to 32 GB by inviting friends to join Dropbox (with 500
MB of additional space gained for each joining friend). In the paid packages,
the maximum capacity envisaged is 100 GB for consumers, while no limit is
advertised for business customers.
For consumers, just two paid packages are offered (Pro50 and Pro100 ),
which charge respectively 9.99 $/month and 19.99 $/month. A referral bonus is
available for these schemes also, with 1 GB of additional space per referral. The
resulting monthly unit prices are shown in Figure 1, where we have neglected
the possible bonus due to referrals. If we neglect the portion of the curve
corresponding to the free package, the price curve is piecewise hyperbolic, with
two local minima, corresponding respectively to the passage from Pro50 to
Pro100 and to the full exploitation of the Pro100 package. By joining the
local minima, we obtain a baseline providing the unit prices of full capacity
exploitation for each pricing package. In this case, the two local minima give
roughly the same unit price of 0.154 ¤/month.
A pricing formula based on the number of customers is instead implied for
business customers. In the business package (named Teams), the number of
users is employed as the price driver, rather than the amount of memory. How-
ever, a relation is provided between the number of users and the maximum
amount of available memory. The basic offer considers 5 users, to which 1 TB is
associated, and then adds 200 GB for each additional user. The basic package is
priced at 795 $ per year, and each additional chunk of 200 GB comes at 125$ per
year. On the basis of Dropbox pricing information, we can derive the following
formula relating the monthly price P (in $) to the number k of customers
P =
170 + 125k
12
k ≥ 5. (1)
The local minima of the monthly unit price, obtained when each capacity chunk
is fully exploited, are given by the following formula
pk =
170 + 125k
2400k
k ≥ 5, (2)
which is a decreasing function of k (made of hyperbolic sections), starting at
0.06625 $ (0.051 ¤) and tending to the limit value 0.052 $, roughly equivalent
to 0.04 euros, just 26% of the minimum price available to consumers.
The monthly unit price for business customers is shown in Figure 2. Again,
we observe the same sawtooth-like trend and the overall economy of scale.
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Figure 1: Unit prices of Dropbox for
consumers
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Figure 2: Unit prices of Dropbox for
business customers
3.2 Crashplan
Crashplan offers four plans, named respectively Crashplan, Crashplan+, Crash-
planpro, and Crashplanpro+, which are advertised on its site www.crashplan.
com.
Among the four plans, the first one is a free package explicitly aimed at
consumers. However, it doesn’t actually provide online storage, but rather a
backup facility to multiple destinations. The Crashplan+ plan comes instead
in three flavours, named respectively Crashplan+10GB, Crashplan+Unlimited,
and Crashplan+FamilyUnlimited. All of them are not free, the first two ones
being limited to 1 computer (hence, implicitly directed to consumers), and the
third one allowing up to 10 computers (catering for families’ needs, as its name
hints). In return for a fixed fee, Crashplan+10GB allows for 10 GB of online
storage, while the other two schemes boast unlimited capacity. The unit price
of Crashplan+10GB reaches then a minimum of 0.208$ per GB per month (0.16
¤) when the capacity is fully exploited. As to other schemes, they cannot be
compared, since they boast unlimited capacity (which would bring the unit price
to zero), a claim which should however be thoroughly verified. They come at
a fixed fee respectively of $ 3/month/computer (Crashplan+Unlimited) and $
6/month/computer (Crashplan+FamilyUnlimited).
The Crashplanpro package starts instead by offering 50 GB (which are as-
sociated to 3 users) and proceeds by adding chunks of capacity as the number
of users grows. The resulting unit price is shown in Figure 3. Despite the usual
sawtooth-like graph we can locate a baseline price at 0.2 ¤, which is 20% larger
than the minimum price established for consumers in the Crashplan+10GB
plan.
3.3 SugarSync
SugarSync (www.sugarsync.com) proposes several plans directed to consumers,
starting with a free plan with a maximum capacity of 5 GB. The paid plans
consider increasing capacity brackets, up to the maximum capacity of 500 GB.
The resulting unit prices are shown in Figure 4, where we can observe the usual
sawtooth-like curve. Here the imaginary baseline is slightly downward, from
0.128 ¤ at the first breakpoint at 30 GB down to 0.061 ¤ at the maximum
capacity.
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Figure 3: Unit prices of Crashplan for business customers
For business customers SugarSync advertises a single plan (others can be
provided on demand, but details are not publicly available), whereby a maxi-
mum capacity of 100 GB is offered at a fixed fee of 29.99 $/month. The resulting
unit price is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 4: Unit prices of SugarSync
(consumers)
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Figure 5: Unit prices of SugarSync
(business)
3.4 IDrive
IDRive (www.idrive.com) offers online storage services both for consumers and
business customers. Though they adopt a classification based on the Basic and
Pro categories (made respectively of one and three packages), we find more
suitable to reclassify them according to our categories related to the nature of
the customers:
• Basic (consumer);
• Pro Personal (consumer);
• Pro Family (consumer);
• Pro Business (business).
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The three packages directed to consumers are easily distinct, since they
provide different storage limits. In particular the Basic package is free but offer
no more than 5 GB of storage space.
In Figure 6, we plot the unit prices for both categories. Again, we ob-
serve that prices for business customers are higher, with a baseline value that is
slightly more than 0.06 euros, nearly three times as much as the minimum price
offered to consumers (0.023 euros when the capacity of the Pro Family package
is fully exploited).
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Figure 6: Unit prices of IDrive
3.5 Google Drive
Google has very recently launched its cloud storage service, named Google Drive,
whose details are available at drive.google.com.
Google Drive include a free plan, which allows users to upload up to 5 GB.
The free plan is associated to other Google services, which actually increase the
amount of info that can be stored on Google’s servers. In addition to the 5 GB
stored on Google Drive, users can use 10 GB on Gmail and 1 GB on Picasa for
free.
There appears to be a single set of pricing plans, which are not explicitly
directed to either business customers or consumers. However, the absence of
particular features in the service advertisement leads to classify that set under
the consumer label. The offer is proposed in the usual form of a set of fixed
fees, each associated to a maximum capacity. The resulting unit price is shown
in Figure 7. We find the usual sawtooth-like curve, with a remarkable baseline
at 0.05 $ (roughly equivalent to 0.0384 ¤).
3.6 Carbonite
Carbonite (www.carbonite.com) offers pricing plans for both customer cate-
gories. There are three pricing plans for consumers, which all boast an unlim-
ited online backup for a fixed fee. The fee is different for the three pricing plans
(named Home, HomePlus, and HomePremier), reflecting different features (see
Table 1). The Home plan does not include External hard drive backup and Mir-
ror Image backup. The HomePremier plan includes also the Courier Recovery
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Figure 7: Unit prices of Google Drive
Pricing plan Yearly fee [$]
Home 59
HomePlus 99
HomePremier 149
Table 1: Pricing plans of Carbonite for consumers
service. As to business customers, Carbonite offers instead two pricing plans,
which are differentiated by storage capacity: the Business plan accepts up to
250 GB; the BusinessPremier accepts up to 500 GB. By considering the two
plans as a single offer subdivided into two capacity brackets, we obtain the unit
price shown in Figure 8, with the usual step in the passage from a bracket to
the next.
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Figure 8: Unit prices of Carbonite for business customers
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3.7 Symform
The solution offered by Symform (www.symform.com) is different from what
most cloud providers propose. Symform describes itself as a network, where
each member of the network contributes excess local storage in exchange for
affordable cloud storage. This peer-to-peer network builds therefore a mutual
backup system. Aside from security and privacy considerations, the peculiarity
of Symform’s solution makes it noncomparable with the pricing plans we have
analysed so far. However, Symform allows also for members of its network not
contributing storage space, by paying a license fee and a larger storage fee. The
license fee is 3.5 $ per end-user and 50 $ per server. The storage capacity is
subdivided into three brackets, up to 1 TB. We can build a pricing plan similar
to those offered to consumers by other providers by considering a single end-
user. The resulting unit price is shown in Figure 9. The shape is quite similar
to what we have observed for other providers.
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Figure 9: Unit prices of Symform
3.8 Mozy
Mozy (mozy.ie) has pricing plans for both customer categories, plus an offer
directed at enterprises (with prices available on-demand, which we have then
neglected in our survey). The offer for consumers is divided into two brackets,
with the second one allowing for three computers rather than just one. The
limit capacity is 125 GB for consumers and 1 TB for business customers. The
resulting unit price is shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively. In the
business case we can locate a baseline at 0.3 ¤.
3.9 Amazon
Amazon proposes a storage service named Simple Storage Service (often iden-
tified as Amazon S3). Details on the service can be obtained on their website
aws.amazon.com/s3/. Their offer includes two versions: Standard Storage and
Reduced Redundancy Storage. The latter trades reduced reliability for a dis-
counted price.
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Figure 10: Unit prices of Mozy for
consumers
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Figure 11: Unit prices of Mozy for
business customers
Maximum amount of data [TB] Price per month per GB[$]
Standard Reduced Redundancy
1 0.125 0.093
50 0.110 0.083
500 0.095 0.073
100 0.090 0.063
5000 0.080 0.053
10000 0.055 0.037
Table 2: Price list of Amazon
The price list is shown in Table 2. It is to be noted that Amazon provides unit
prices, while all the other providers release lump prices valid up to a specified
amount of data. The discount obtained by reducing reliability ranges from 23%
to 33%. In addition, we notice that the range of data volumes supported by the
service is very wide, with a maximum capacity of 5 million GB..
In the following, we consider just the standard version. The resulting unit
price curve (a stairwise one) is shown in Figure 12. We observe a significant
volume discount.
4 Comparing and classifying pricing plans
In Section 3, we have reported the pricing plans of a wide selection of cloud
providers. In this section, we proceed to categorize those plans and compare
them, searching for the cheapest ones.
We start by observing that most pricing plans allow for some free space (see
Table 3). The typical value is 5 GB, which, though a very small fraction of the
typical storage space on one’s own laptop computer (of the order of one or few
percentage points), could be enough for storing data that a customer wants to
share temporarily.
Aside from the free storage offered for limited quantities, all the pricing plans
currently adopted by cloud providers allow for price discrimination by quantity.
However, they are not all equal and fall into two categories: declining block rate
charge and bundling.
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Figure 12: Unit price of Amazon S3
Provider Free storage space [GB]
Dropbox 2
SugarSync 5
IDrive 5
Google Drive 5
Table 3: Amount of free space
The first pricing model is also named taper and is a particular type of the
general block rate pricing, where the range of consumption is subdivided into
subranges and the unit price is held constant over each subrange. More formally,
in a block rate tariff the overall price charged to the customer for a volume of
consumption x is
p =

v(1)x if 0 < x ≤ q(1)
v(1)q(1) + v(2)(x− q(1)) if q(1) < x ≤ q(2)
· · ·∑m−1
i=1 v
(i)q(i) + v(m)(x− q(m−1)) if q(m−1) < x ≤ q(m)
(3)
where the v(i)s are the sequence of marginal prices, and the q(i)s bracket the
subranges over which the marginal price is held constant. In Equation (3), we
assume that the cloud provider does not provide more than q(m) units of storage
(m ≥ 2). In turn, block-rate pricing can be seen as a special form of multi-part
tariff, where the fixed fee has been set equal to zero.
The overall charge is then a piecewise linear function of the amount of storage
capacity (see Figure 13). Diminishing prices at the margin stimulate consump-
tion, which in turn permits the construction of large scale capacity.
Block rate pricing has been studied by a number of authors. A consistent
theory for block tariffs has been developed in [11].
Of all the cloud providers examined, just Amazon follows a declining block
rate pricing model.
All the other providers adopt instead a bundling pricing model (which in the
11
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q(1) q(2) q(3)
Figure 13: Price-volume relationship in Block rate pricing
literature is also called quantity discount). According to the definition given by
Shy [12], a seller practices bundling if the firm sells packages containing at
least two units of the same product or service, where the price of a package
containing several units of the same good is lower than the sum of the prices
if the goods were purchased separately. In our case, all the providers opt for
multiple bundling, where more than one package is offered for sale, and at least
one package contains at least two units.
By using multiple packages, the cloud provider can address the different
demand functions of its customers and extract as much profit as possible from
each of them. By selecting the right quantities to be included in the bundles,
the seller can design a preference revealing mechanism and segment the market
among the consumer types. In [12] an example is shown with two consumer
types and two packages.
Given the dicotomy in the pricing models adopted by cloud providers (though
the two groups are extremely unbalanced), it is natural to ask which is better.
Kolay and Shaffer have derived the conditions under which bundling is better
than block rates for the seller [13]. For the case of two consumer types that differ
in their quantity demanded of a product of fixed quality, they have shown that
profits for the seller are higher with bundling than with two-part tariffs as long
as standard single-crossing conditions apply and as long as it is optimal to serve
all consumers at least some output. The single-crossing condition requires that
the demand curve of a high-demand consumer is weakly above the demand curve
of a low-demand consumer. Of course, the direction of comparison reverses if
we adopt the viewpoint of the customer rather than the cloud provider.
Though the cloud providers, with the exception of Amazon, all adopt the
bundling pricing model, the differences among them lie in the price they charge.
If we stick to price ad the dominant criterion of choice, the prospective customer
has to compare all the proposed pricing plans and pick up the cheapest. Since,
12
Capacity bracket [GB] Most convenient provider
Consumers
10-25 Google Drive
30-100 Google Drive and IDrive
110-500 IDrive
Business
10-70 Amazon
80-100 IDrive
110-150 Amazon
160-200 IDrive
210-400 Amazon
410-500 IDrive
510-520 Amazon
530-10000 Dropbox
Table 4: Comparison of unit prices
the unit price varies widely with the amount of storage leased, in the following
we perform a pointwise comparison, by identifying the cheapest cloud provider
for each capacity bracket. We underline that the comparison is conducted by
taking into account just prices, without reference to the additional features that
the pricing plan may incorporate.
We report the result in Table 4. As to consumers, the field is largely domi-
nated by Google Drive (for smaller capacity values) and IDrive (for moderate to
large capacity values). In the 30-100 GB range the unit price of both providers
are practically identical, differing for less than 0.001 ¤. For business customers,
the dominant players for small to moderate capacity values (roughly up to 500
GB) are Amazon and again IDrive, while for larger capacity values Dropbox
takes definitely the lead.
5 A two-part tariff approximation and Pareto
dominance
In Section 4, we have classified the pricing plans and compared them on a
pointwise basis. Though all but one belong to the class of bundling packages, the
pricing plans differ from one another for the choice of prices and bundles, which
makes a pointwise comparison the only possibility. However, such a comparison
does not tell us anything about the structural properties of the pricing plan.
We recognize that bundling is a form of nonlinear pricing, whereby the price
changes with quantity to reflect the presence of fixed costs and the variation
of marginal costs. For the purpose of comparing the structure of pricing plans,
we can consider the simplest form of nonlinear pricing: a two-part tariff. In
this section, we develop a two-part tariff approximation for all the pricing plans
considered and use that approximation to classify them.
In the two-part tariff scheme, the customer pays an initial fixed fee f for
the first unit (often justified as a subscription, access, or installation charge),
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plus a smaller constant price for each unit [14]. The overall price charged to the
customer is
p(x) = f + v · x, (4)
where v is the marginal price, and x is the volume of consumption, i.e., the
amount of storage capacity. The resulting amount charged to the consumer is
a linear function of the storage capacity (see Figure 14). For large volumes the
fixed fee is gradually absorbed and its impact is less relevant, highlighting the
economy of scale embedded in the service process. The unit price is
p(1) =
f
x
+ v, (5)
which has the shape of a hyperbola as in Figure 15 and asymptotically tends to
the marginal price v.
Volume
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Figure 14: Price in a two-part tariff
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Figure 15: Unit price in a two-part
tariff
In order to obtain a two-part approximation for the bundling pricing plans
shown in Section 3, we must estimate the values of the two parameters f and
v. For that purpose, we adopt a least-square approach.
If we sample the unit price curves, we obtain a set of (x, p(1)) points for each
pricing plan. The distance between the actual pricing plan and the two-part
model is
Q =
∑
i
(
f
xi
+ v − p(1)i
)2
. (6)
We obtain the best estimates for the two parameters f and v through minimizing
Q, i.e., zeroing the two derivatives ∂Q/∂f and ∂Q/∂v. This is tantamount to
solving the system of two linear equations∑
i
1
xi
(
f
xi
+ v − p(1)i
)
= 0,
∑
i
(
f
xi
+ v − p(1)i
)
= 0.
(7)
For a set of n points the resulting estimates are
fˆ =
n
∑
i p
(1)
i /xi −
∑
i p
(1)
i
∑
i 1/xi
n
∑
i 1/x
2
i − (
∑
i 1/xi)
2 ,
vˆ =
∑
i p
(1)
i − fˆ
∑
i 1/xi
n
.
(8)
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Pricing plan fˆ vˆ
Consumers
Google Drive 1.298 0.0532
IDrive 3.42 0.0217
Dropbox 7.412 0.0667
SugarSync 3.231 0.089
Symform 8.58 0.106
Mozy 4.91 0.033
Business
Dropbox 47.449 0.0193
IDrive 6.3 0.077
Crashplan 9.674 0.267
Carbonite 15.23 0.038
Mozy 6.60 0.401
Table 5: Parameters of two-part approximation model
The resulting values for the parameters are reported in Table 5.
We can now exploit the parameters of the two-part tariff approximations to
compare the structure of the pricing plans. We first plot the couple of parameter
values obtained for each cloud provider; we report the resulting scatterplot in
Figure 16 and Figure 17 for consumers and business customers respectively.
A price structure is to be considered attractive if both the fixed fee and the
variable price per unit are low. On the scatterplots just introduced, the best
pricing plans are those represented by points in the bottom left corner (low FF
and low VP; the worst ones are instead those located in the top right corner.
Large differences appear between the pricing plans. In the case of consumers,
Symform exhibits the largest values both for the fixed fee and the marginal
price; Google Drive provides the lowest fee, but it is Idrive that asks for the
lowest marginal price. In the case of business customers, Dropbox provides at
the same time the lowest marginal price but the largest fixed fee.
We can perform an overall comparison among the several pricing plans by
using the concept of Pareto dominance. The concept of Pareto dominance is of
extreme importance in multi-objective optimization. Given a set of objectives,
a solution is said to Pareto dominate another if the first is not inferior to the
second in all objectives, and, additionally, there is at least one objective where it
is better (see chapter 6 of [15]). Pareto dominance has been applied extensively
in the context of service tariffing (see, e.g., the works [16] and [17]). Here we
take the customer’s viewpoint and consider as its objective the minimization
of the price whatever the quantity of storage capacity that is leased. In the
comparison between two two-part tariff schemes, this objective is reached iff
both parameters in Equation (4) are lower in one of the two scheme instances.
We therefore say that a pricing plan dominates another if both its f and its v
are lower. In order to identify the most attractive pricing plan, we can therefore
eliminate the dominated ones.
If we look at the consumer pricing plans shown in Figure 16, we see that
there is not a single dominant plan, but Symform is dominated by every other
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provider. Both SugarSync and Dropbox are dominated by Google Drive and
can therefore be removed from the competition. Mozy (as well as Dropbox) is
instead dominated by IDrive. In the end, the best two pricing plans are those
offered by Google Drive and IDrive, neither of which dominates the other. In the
case of business pricing plans, Crashplan and Mozy are dominated by IDrive,
but IDrive does not dominate either Carbonite or Dropbox (though the latter
has a very high fixed fee). We end up with three best competitors: IDrive,
Carbonite, and Dropbox.
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Figure 16: Two-part tariff parame-
ters for consumer pricing plans
0 10 20 30 40
Fixed Fee
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
M
ar
gin
al 
un
it p
ric
e
IDrive
Carbonite
Crashplan
Mozy
Dropbox
Figure 17: Two-part tariff parame-
ters for business pricing plans
6 Conclusions
We have surveyed the cloud storage packages offered by major providers and put
them on a level ground by computing the unit price for each of them over the
whole range of capacity values. With the notable exception of Amazon (which
follows a block-declining pricing scheme), all the providers adopt a bundling
policy. We have compared the pricing plans both on a pointwise basis and on
the overall (through a two-part tariff approximation, which uncovers the fixed
fee and the marginal price of each pricing plan). Through the first analysis,
we determine the cheapest pricing plan for each capacity range. Through the
two-part tariff approximation, we apply a Pareto dominance analysis to identify
dominated pricing plans, which can be removed from the shortlist of providers
from which to choose. In both analyses, a limited number of providers emerge
to be considered as prospective providers on the basis of price only.
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